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In this paper we analyze firms’ earnings management behavior to avoid losses conditional 
on the (asymmetric) incentive underlying market (positive/negative) returns. Our intuition 
is that firms with negative returns in the period (bad news, BN) face a higher incentive to 
undertake earnings management, and that their ultimate intention is to hide from credit 
markets a signal (loss) that could be translated into a negative impact on their cost of debt.  
The  empirical  evidence  supports  this  intuition.  BN  firms  show  higher  earnings 
management pervasiveness than their counterparts with good news (GN), and the set with 
simultaneous BN and prior period positive earnings undertake more pervasive earnings 
manipulation than BN firms in general. Within this restricted set of firms, and consistent 
with a cost of debt explanation, we find that firms with larger needs of debt show a higher 
incidence of earnings management to avoid losses.   
The  overall  empirical  evidence  challenges  the  implicit  assumption  in  Burgstahler  and 
Dichev (1997) that the incentive to manage earnings is homogeneous to all firms, and 
suggests that the discontinuities around zero in the earnings distributions are driven, at 
least partly, by firms’ earnings management behavior.  
 
 
Keywords: earnings management, earnings thresholds, earnings discontinuities, cost of 
debt.  
Data availability: data are available from the commercial sources identified in the paper. 




1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper we analyze firms’ earnings management behavior to avoid losses conditional 
on the (asymmetric) incentive underlying market (positive/negative) returns.
1 Our intuition 
is  that  firms  with  negative  returns  in  the  period  face  a  higher  incentive  to  undertake 
earnings management, and that their ultimate intention is to hide from credit markets a 
signal (loss) that could negatively affect their cost of debt.  
The transaction costs theory predicts that the costs of information treatment might lead 
some  stakeholders  to  determine  the  terms  of  the  transactions  with  the  firm  based  on 
heuristic cutoffs at zero (change in) earnings. A loss (earnings decrease) may thus convey 
a signal to outsiders evaluating the firm, in particular credit raters and stock analysts, 
negatively affecting firms’ credit ratings and their cost of debt (e.g. Dechow et al., 2000). 
However, such a signal may be differently weighed by outsiders, depending on the firms’ 
past signals. 
Consider a firm with negative returns (BN) and pre-managed earnings slightly below zero. 
It is likely that this firm had positive earnings in the previous year, so a signal is being sent 
to  credit  markets.  Managers  might  avoid  the  cost  of  a  rating  change  if  they  manage 
earnings upward. They have a strong incentive to do so.  
Now consider a firm with positive returns (GN) and pre-managed earnings slightly below 
zero. GN suggests that the firm’s previous earnings were also negative. The signal was 
sent out the previous year and the cost incurred. As it is unlikely that credit markets use 
zero earnings as a signal on the up side the manipulation is not worth the cost. As a result, 
                                                            
1  Schipper  (1989)  and  Healy  and  Wahlen  (1999),  amongst  others,  define  earnings  management  as  the 
outcome of managers’ use of judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 




less earnings management will be expected for this GN firm. Hence, firms might face an 
asymmetric incentive to manipulate, depending on the sign of their market returns and on 
how  they  approach  the  earnings  target  –  from  above  or  from  below  –,  and  a  higher 
incentive is expected to be translated into greater earnings management.
2  
This intuition seems to highlight the importance of the cost of debt as firms’ ultimate 
incentive to undertake earnings management to avoid losses. Given that the sensitivity of a 
firm to this cost depends on its exposure to credit markets, we expect such an incentive to 
be higher for firms with larger needs of debt. 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), hereafter referred to as BD (1997), DeGeorge et al. (1999) 
and Gore et al. (2001), amongst others, analyze the distribution of net income departing 
from the assumption that in the absence of earnings management, such a distribution will 
be smooth. They find graphical and statistical evidence that there is an unusually high 
frequency of firms in earnings intervals immediately to the right of zero and an unusually 
low frequency in those to the left.
3 Using earnings levels and earnings changes as their 
variables, they take  these  unexpected  frequencies as evidence that  firms manage their 
earnings to avoid earnings losses or earnings decreases, consistent with the transaction 
costs  theory.  The  implicit  assumption  in  all  these  studies  is  that  firms’  incentives  to 
undertake  earnings  management  are  homogeneous.  The  intuition  discussed  so  far 
challenges this assumption.  
                                                            
2 We thank Professor Ross Watts for this insight on firms’ incentives to undertake earnings management 
around the zero target. 
3 Throughout the paper “unusual frequencies” and “discontinuities around/at zero” are interchangeably used 




To  detect  evidence  of  earnings  management  we  depart  from  the  same  graphical 
methodology as in BD (1997), but extend it to control for the effect of GN and BN, and 
that of approaching the earnings target from above (below).
4  
The  empirical  evidence  supports  our  expectations.  Earnings  management  is 
asymmetrically related to the type of news firms receive during the period. BN firms have 
a higher degree of earnings management pervasiveness to avoid losses, consistent with a 
higher incentive to manipulate earnings. Moreover, such an incentive is also affected by 
the way firms approach the zero earnings target. BN firms approaching the target from 
above, i.e. having prior period positive earnings, show higher pervasiveness than BN firms 
approaching the target from below, consistent with a higher incentive. Finally, but of equal 
importance,  firms’  needs  of  debt  appear  as  a  significant  determinant  of  earnings 
management  to avoid  losses,  consistent  with  the  expectation that firms  avoid  sending 
signals to credit markets that may negatively affect their cost of debt. The evidence we 
gathered thus shows that the empirical global earnings distribution is the joint effect of 
distributions  of  firms  with  distinct  incentives  to  manipulate  earnings.  Such  evidence 
challenges the implicit assumption in BD (1997) that the incentives are homogeneous to 
all firms in the distribution. The results are robust to graphical and statistical tests, and to 
                                                            
4 Because the distribution of earnings changes is a noisy version of the distribution of earnings levels (e.g. 
Beaver et al., 2003) and because DeGeorge et al. (1999) present the avoidance of losses as firms’ main 
earnings management threshold, we follow BD (1997) and restrict our analysis to the latter distribution. 
More  recently,  Brown  and  Caylor  (2005)  find  evidence  suggesting  that  firms’  earnings  management 
thresholds evolved through time. For the period 1996-2001, their evidence shows that the main threshold is 
the  avoidance  of  negative  earnings  surprises.  However,  such  evidence  does  not  contradict,  and  even 
supports, the fact that for the years of our sample DeGeorge et al.’s (1999) and BD’s (1997) rankings of the 
thresholds are valid. Nevertheless, we also tested for change in earnings distribution and the conclusions, 




tests  of  Probit  models  that  control  for  some  of  the  main  variables  that  might  affect 
earnings and the shape of its distribution.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop the hypotheses to be tested 
and briefly discuss the literature. In Section 3 we introduce the research design and the 
sample selection, and in Section 4 the empirical results are discussed. Finally, in Section 
5, we draw a brief conclusion. 
 
2.  Earnings management to avoid losses: development of the testing hypotheses. 
 
Managers’ earnings management behavior is all related to costs and benefits. The costs 
are,  for  example,  the  time  managers  take  in  planning  and  implementing  earnings 
management actions and the effect on managers’ reputation if and when manipulation is 
discovered. The benefits can be grouped by taking into account the direct beneficiary of 
earnings management: managers or the firm. Amongst the incentives related to managers’ 
private benefit, the maximization of bonus compensation and hiding poor performance to 
keep their jobs should be mentioned. Amongst those related to direct benefit for the firm, 
the  most  important  are  the  avoidance  of  (i)  debt  covenants  violations;  (ii)  market 
penalization for reporting losses, breaking a string of positive earnings or not meeting 
analysts’ forecasts; (iii) increases in transaction costs with stakeholders, and (iv) a rating 
change  in  credit  markets.  There  is  an  incentive  (motivation)  to  undertake  earnings 
management when the benefits outweigh the costs.  
In their analysis BD (1997) assume that the benefits of earnings management are constant 
to all firms and thus the incentives are related to the (ex ante) costs of manipulation. 
However, this perspective does not explain why, for example, firms with longer strings of 




In our paper we therefore adopt a contrasting perspective. We assume that the costs of 
manipulation are (relatively) constant to all firms, making the incentive directly related to 
the benefits firms may obtain. For example, firms that may avoid a change in their credit 
ratings face a higher potential benefit, and incentive, than those that saw already their 
ratings degraded.  This seems to be a more realistic perspective, and is consistent with 
long or short term strategies underlying earnings management.    
DeFond and Park (1997) find evidence suggesting that firms tend to smooth (manage) 
earnings in order to spread profits obtained in the current period over future periods (a 
“save for the future” strategy), or to reflect in the current period benefits expected to be 
gained in the future (a “borrow from the future” strategy). These strategies are consistent 
with investors’ preference for stable earnings through time (e.g. Barth et al., 1999) and, 
potentially,  may  be  considered  to  be  informative  regarding  firms’  persistent  earnings. 
However, firms may also manage earnings to achieve more immediate earnings targets, 
such  as  avoiding  current  earnings  decreases  or  losses.  This  behavior  is  not  at  all 
informative and may be deemed as opportunistic, fitting with the earnings management 
definitions of Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999).  
The evidence in BD (1997), DeGeorge et al. (1999) and Beatty et al. (2002) for the USA, 
and Gore et al. (2001) for the UK, amongst others, seems to support this behavior. They 
find graphical and statistical evidence suggesting that firms manage their earnings to avoid 
small earnings losses or decreases. BD (1997) suggest an explanation for firms’ earnings 
management behavior based on the transaction costs theory. This theory predicts that: (i) 
earnings  information  affects  the  terms  of  transactions  between  the  firm  and  its 
stakeholders, favoring firms with higher earnings. Firms that report earnings decreases or 
losses tend to face higher costs in transactions; (ii) the costs of information treatment 




based on heuristic cutoffs at zero (change in) earnings. A loss (earnings decrease) may 
thus convey a signal to outsiders evaluating the firm, in particular credit raters and stock 
analysts, negatively affecting firms’ credit ratings and their cost of debt (e.g. Dechow et 
al., 2000). Thus, both these predictions suggest that firms tend to avoid reporting earnings 
decreases or losses, and face an incentive to manage earnings.  
Accounting and finance literatures show that stock prices in efficient and unbiased capital 
markets  reflect  investors’ expectations about firms’ future performance, built  upon all 
available information (e.g. Ball and Brown, 1968). The sign of market returns can thus be 
a source of information about such expectations, implicitly about firms’ (pre-managed) 
earnings,  and  reflect  firms’  signals.  These  can  be  differently  weighed  by  outsiders 
depending on firms’ past signals. 
Consider a firm with current negative returns (BN) and pre-managed earnings slightly 
below zero. It is likely that this firm reported positive earnings in the previous year, so a 
signal is being sent to credit markets. Managers might avoid the cost of a rating change if 
they manage earnings upward. They have a strong incentive to do so.
5 Now consider a 
firm with current positive returns (GN) and pre-managed earnings slightly below zero. GN 
suggests that firm’s previous reported earnings were also negative. The signal was sent out 
the previous year and the cost incurred. As it is unlikely that credit markets use zero 
earnings as a signal on the up side, the manipulation is not worth the cost. As a result less 
earnings  management  is  expected  for  this  GN  firm.  Hence,  a  firm  might  face  an 
asymmetric  incentive  to  undertake  manipulation  depending  on  the  sign  of  its  market 
returns and on how it approaches the earnings target – from above or from below.  
                                                            
5  The  literature  shows  evidence  that  the  level  of  pre-managed  earnings  is  a  determinant  of  earnings 




Therefore, for firms with pre-managed negative earnings close to zero, it seems intuitive 
that those with BN face a stronger incentive to manage earnings upwards.
6  Amongst 
them, firms that had prior period positive earnings, i.e. that approach the zero earnings 
target from above, might have a stronger incentive to undertake earnings management 
than otherwise. These intuitions are expressed in the following hypotheses: 
H1: BN firms manage earnings to avoid losses in a more pervasive way than GN 
firms. 
H2: BN firms approaching the earnings target from above, i.e. with prior period 
positive earnings, manage earnings to avoid losses in a more pervasive way 
than firms with prior period negative earnings. 
 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) show empirical evidence that firms 
manage earnings to avoid debt covenants violation and the related penalty in the cost of 
debt. The intuition we discussed above suggests that debt may play another important role 
in motivating firms’ earnings management beyond that of the debt covenant hypothesis. 
For BN firms that had prior period positive earnings, the cost of debt seems to be the 
ultimate incentive to avoid losses. Given that the sensitivity of a firm to this type of cost 
depends on its exposure to credit markets, we expect that incentive to be higher for firms 
with larger needs of debt. 
This intuition is expressed in the following hypothesis: 
                                                            
6 The direction of the manipulation is considered for firms with pre-managed (change in) earnings close to 
the target. Otherwise, firms may choose an income decreasing strategy of the “big-bath” type, creating 




H3: BN firms with prior period positive earnings and larger needs of debt manage 
earnings to avoid losses in a more pervasive way than firms with fewer needs of 
debt. 
   
The next section discusses the research design and sample selection adopted to test these 
hypotheses. 
 
3.  Research design and sample selection 
 
3.1.  Graphical analysis 
The  main  feature  of  BD’s  (1997)  methodology  is  its  simplicity.
7  It  is  based  on  the 
distribution of earnings and on the assumption that in the absence of earnings management 
this distribution will be smooth. The empirical distribution is a histogram of the cross-
sectional  frequency  of  firm-years  by  intervals  of  the  deflated  earnings  variable.
8  The 
existence  of  earnings  management  to  avoid  losses  is  expected  to  take  the  form  of 
unusually low frequencies of small losses and unusually high frequencies of small profits. 
BD (1997), using a sample of USA companies from the period 1976-1994, find such 
discontinuities at zero and take them as evidence of firms’ earnings management.  
To test the null hypothesis that the distribution is smooth or, stated the other way round, 
that there are discontinuities around zero earnings, BD (1997) use a statistic based on  the 
difference between the actual number of observations (firm-years) in an interval and the 
                                                            
7 For a discussion of the limitations of this methodology to deal with managers’ incentives to undertake 
earnings management and the earnings targets they pursue, see, amongst others, McNichols (2000).  
8 The intervals are defined as a percentage of deflated earnings. As in BD (1997), we use 0.0025 and 0.005 




expected  number  for  that  same  interval,  divided  by  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
difference. The latter is defined as follows: 




1 1 1 1 + - + - - - +
+ - =
i i i i
i i
p p p p N
p Np std ,  
where N is the total number of observations in the sample and pi is the probability that an 
observation will fall into interval i. Under the null hypothesis of smoothness, this statistic 
is distributed approximately normally with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
The expected number of observations for a given interval is defined as the average of the 
number of observations in the two adjacent intervals.  
This statistic has its shortcomings. For example, it does not work well for maxima or 
minima of the distributions. Moreover, if the null hypothesis of smoothness does not hold 
at  zero,  the  standardized  differences  for  the  interval  immediately  left  of  zero  and 
immediately right of zero are not independent. However, the same insufficiencies apply to 




The specificity of our own research design is based on the classification of each firm-year 
according  to  the  sign  of  market  returns  (BN,  bad  news  if  negative)  related  to  that 
observation, and on the way firms approach the zero earnings target. The analysis is thus 
performed for sub-samples of GN and BN firm-year observations, and sub-samples of 
                                                            
9 Using the same notation we used above to describe BD’s (1997) statistic, DeGeorge et al.’s (1999) statistic 
is defined as the difference between 1 - - i i p p  and its expected value measured as mean  1 - - j j p p , where j 
includes all classes in the distribution excluding class i. This difference is standardized by the standard 
deviation of  1 - - j j p p . 
10 Given the explicit nature of the graphical evidence we do not expect the conclusions to be sensitive to the 




prior period positive and negative earnings. The differences between the distributions of 
each sub-sample are then statistically tested.
11 
 
3.2.  Probit analysis 
BD (1997), DeGeorge et al. (1999) and Beatty et al. (2002), for the USA, and Gore et al. 
(2001),  for  the  UK,  amongst  others,  relate  earnings  management  to  the  use  of 
(discretionary) accruals, consistent with the evidence in the literature, and with accruals 
flexibility and low management cost relative to cash flows (e.g. Healy, 1985; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Bushee, 1998). However, Dechow et al. (2003) do not find evidence 
supporting  discretionary  accruals  as  an  explanation  for  the  earnings  distribution 
discontinuities at zero. Their results do not come as a complete surprise if we take into 
account, as the authors do, the evidence in the literature showing that the methodology 
underlying the estimation of (aggregate) discretionary accruals is not completely reliable 
(e.g. McNichols, 2000). Nevertheless, Beaver et al. (2003) argue that at least a part of the 
discontinuities  is  driven  by  nondiscretionary  earnings  components,  for  instance  the 
asymmetric impact on profit and loss firms of taxes and special items, and Dechow et al. 
(2003) and Durtschi and Easton (2005) relate these discontinuities to the deflator of the 
earnings variable.  
Beatty et al. (2002), for the bank industry, put forward additional evidence supporting the 
notion that the discontinuities around zero are due to earnings management. As in their 
                                                            
11 The assumptions underlying this type of analysis, about the shape of the earnings distribution, may be 
questionable  due to their lack of theoretical support. However, Hayn (1995), using a different research 
design, finds a similar kind of discontinuity at zero earnings. One may always argue that such discontinuities 
may  not  be  due to  earnings  management,  but to  firms’  achievement  of  “normal  business  targets”  (e.g. 
increase in sales, positive earnings). This is an old unresolved question. The literature is still in need of a 




research, we use Probit models. Our aim is to test whether our graphical results and the 
differences in the discontinuities hold after controlling for some of the main effects that 
may influence the sign of current earnings. It is thus a way of testing the robustness of the 
results obtained from the graphical analysis. Moreover, we also use the model to test for 
the intuition on the cost of debt hypothesis (H3). 
The control variables included in the model, such as size, taxes and special items, find 
support in the literature, namely in Beatty et al. (2002), BD (1997) and Beaver et al. 
(2003).  
We estimate a set of models based on the following global model: 
it t k i j it it
it it it
it it it it it
e YEAR IND TAX SPITEM
SIZE DEBT PRIOR D DEBT PRIOR
DEBT PRIOR D PRIOR D INTERV
￿ ￿ + + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
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a a a a
a a a
a a a a a
 
 
where the variables are: 
 
INTERV = dummy variable that takes a value of one if net income is in the interval ] 0; 
0.0025 ] and a value of zero if the firm has deflated net income in the interval ] -
0.0025; 0 ]; 
D1 = dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm has negative market returns 
(bad news) in the year, zero otherwise; 
PRIOR = dummy variable that takes a value of one if prior period earnings (#172) is 
positive, zero otherwise; 
D1_ PRIOR = interactive variable defined as D1*PRIOR; 
DEBT = dummy variable that takes a value of one if the percentage change in total debt 
[￿(#6-#216)t / (#6-#216)t-1] in the current period is positive, zero otherwise; 
PRIOR_DEBT = interactive variable defined as PRIOR*DEBT;  
D1_PRIOR_DEBT = interactive variable defined as D1*PRIOR*DEBT; 
SIZE = dummy variable that takes a value of one if firm market value (#199*#25) is in 
the upper third of the distribution, zero otherwise;  
SPITEM = Special Items (#17), deflated by prior period total assets (#6); 




SIND  =  set  of  dummy  variables  that  take  a  value  one  if  the  firm  belongs  to  the 
industry, zero otherwise; 
SYEAR = set of dummy variables that take a value one if the firm-year corresponds to 
the year, zero otherwise; 
i,t = firm and year (1976-1994) indexes, respectively.
12 
 
D1 is a variable that controls for the sign of market returns. The evidence in Basu (1997) 
shows an asymmetric relation between net income and current returns, with the former 
variable  being  more  sensitive  to  negative  returns.  Taking  this  relation,  Garrod  and 
Valentincic (2001), for the UK, and Moreira (2002), for the USA, find that by controlling 
an earnings sample for the sign of net income, the coefficient on a dummy variable with a 
value of one for negative current returns (BN) tends not to be significant for positive 
earnings. This means that in our model we should also expect the coefficient on D1 not to 
be statistically significant. However, if our intuition about the impact of BN on firms’ 
incentive to undertake earnings management holds, then we will expect the coefficient on 
D1 to be positive, i.e. BN firms are expected to report significantly more small positive 
and fewer small negative earnings. We thus predict a positive coefficient on D1 ( 0   1 > a ).  
PRIOR  controls  for  prior  period  earnings  sign.  As  discussed  above  and  expressed  in 
hypothesis H2, the way firms approach the earnings target might affect the incentive they 
have to undertake earnings management. BN firms with prior period positive earnings are 
expected to undertake more pervasive earnings manipulation. However, PRIOR, in itself, 
is  not  expected  to  be  a  determinant  of  the  discontinuities.  Thus,  we  predict  that  the 
coefficient  on  this  variable  ( 2 a )  will  not  be  statistically  significant,  and  that  on 
D1_PRIOR it will be positive ( 0 3 > a ).  
                                                            




DEBT is a proxy for firms’ needs of debt, reflecting the current pressure they may suffer 
to avoid increases in their cost of debt. However, such a pressure is expected to exist only 
in cases where there was no previous negative signal sent to credit markets. Therefore, we 
expect the coefficient on this variable ( 4 a ) and that on PRIOR_DEBT ( 5 a ) not to be 
statistically  significant.  The  coefficient  on  D1_PRIOR_DEBT  ( 6 a )  is  expected  to  be 
positive, consistent with our third hypothesis. 
SIZE, SPITEM and TAX are control variables. Given that there is no strong theory to 
explain their potential impact on firms’ incentives to undertake earnings management, we 
do not assign any prediction about the sign of their coefficients. The same applies to SIND 
and SYEAR, two sets of variables that aim to control for industry and year effects.  
 
3.3.    Definition of the variables 
a)  The degree of earnings management pervasiveness (pp) 
Considering 
i
a n  as the number of actual firms in interval i (i = first interval to the left of 
zero; first interval to the right of zero) and 
i
e n  as the expected number of firms in that 
same interval in the pre-managed earnings distribution, we define firms’ degree of earning 
management pervasiveness (pp) as the absolute value of the following ratio (proportion): 












This  definition  is  similar  to  that  used  in  BD  (1997),  and  the  same  happens  to  the 
expectation of the number of  observations in a given interval. Such  an expectation is 
defined as the average of the actual number of observations in two adjacent intervals.
13 
                                                            
13 We used other definitions for this expectation, namely the average of up to eight adjacent intervals, but the 




Thus, the degree of pervasiveness appears as a proportion of the predicted number of firms 
undertaking earnings management in a given interval over the expected number of firms in 
this interval in the pre-managed earnings distribution.
14 
 
b)  Good and bad news 




c)  Other variables 
As  in  BD  (1997),  we  use  net  income  (#172)  as  the  earnings  variable.  To  dilute  the 
differences in the size of firms in the sample the observations are deflated. We use the 
beginning-of-the-year total assets for year t (#6) to deflate earnings.
17  
                                                            
14 The literature does not offer clear evidence to guarantee that this measure is completely uncorrelated with 
the partition variable. If there were any correlation, there would be a measurement error (McNichols and 
Wilson,  1988;  Beaver  et  al.,  2003).  However,  given  that  the  research  design  adopted  is  based  on  the 
comparison of such a measure for two sub-samples, measurement errors, if any, might offset each other, at 
least partly. Moreover, since we use graphical and statistical approaches simultaneously, we do not expect 
our conclusions to be affected by any potential measurement error.     
15 As a robustness test, we re-performed the graphical analysis of the discontinuities around zero controlling 
for small (positive and negative) returns. That is, we defined GN (BN) firms as those with RET > x% (< -
x%), where x is equal to 1%, 2%, 5% and 10%. In all these situations the results were qualitatively similar to 
those discussed in the paper. We thank Professor David Otley for this suggestion. 
16 The market returns used in this paper are estimated using Compustat fiscal year-end prices (#199) and 
dividends per share (#26). We have taken missing dividends per share as no dividend payment. Although 
this specification of buy-and-hold returns does not reflect the impact of the earnings announcement, it has 
the advantage of isolating the impact of publicly available “news” received from other sources not related to 
the previous year (e.g. Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 2000; Pope and Walker, 1999). Moreover, it tends not to 
reflect  the  impact  of  earnings  management  performed  at  the  fiscal  year  end,  consistent  with  our 





3.4.    Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
We follow the same procedure as in BD (1997) to replicate their sample of earnings levels. 
The data is for the USA, and for the period 1976/1994.
18 From the 2003 Compustat disks 
we consider all non-financial companies, except utilities, available in Primary, Secondary 
and  Tertiary,  Full  Coverage  and  Research  Annual  Industrial  Files.  All  missing 
observations in earnings variables, deflators and returns are deleted. As in BD (1997), the 
upper and lower 1% of deflated earnings for each year is considered as missing. The 
sample we obtain after controlling for GN/BN news is slightly larger than the equivalent 
sample in BD (1997), i.e. 79 311 as opposed to 75 999 observations.
19 In Table 1, Panel A, 
we tabulate some descriptive statistics for the global sample. The number of observations 
per year is in most cases higher than 4000 observations, increasing steadily until the last 
year (1994) where it reaches 5181. The proportion of GN and BN per year does not follow 
a steady evolution, but ranges between 40 percent and 60 percent, with a slight decrease of 




                                                                                                                                                                                
17 We also tested for earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations available for common 
stock (#237), and for (lagged) market value of common equity (#199*#25) as a deflator. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported, and do not support the suggestion in Durtschi and Easton (2005) that 
the discontinuities are (at least partly) driven by the use of lagged market value as the deflator. 
18 The analysis was also performed using different data samples. The results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported. 
19 This difference arises because we use a different deflator (lagged total assets instead of lagged market 
value), collect the data from more recent disks, and control the sample for market returns and for prior 





Around 72 percent of the total firm-years have current positive earnings, but since 1985 
this percentage is very close to 60 percent. The mean of deflated earnings is consistent 
with this evolution and with previous literature showing an increased number of firms 
reporting  negative  earnings  over  time  (e.g.  Givoly  and  Hayn,  2000).  It  becomes 
increasingly negative after 1984, although the median stays positive and relatively stable, 
consistent with more negative earnings and a higher dispersion.  
Panel B shows that BN firms on average have lower mean and median deflated earnings 
than GN firms and a lower proportion of profits (around 58 percent), consistent with our 
early expectation that bad news (negative returns) tend to reflect (pre-managed) earnings 
decreases or losses. 
The firm-years in the two central intervals of the earnings distribution are the basic sample 
used to perform the Probit analysis. Panel C shows the selection of the working sample, 
which has 1,138 observations (276 and 862, respectively to the left and to the right of 




For this sample, untabulated descriptive statistics show that the correlation coefficients of 
the main variables used in the Probit analysis are very small or even insignificant. The 
(obvious) exception is NI, deflated net income, which is highly correlated with the sign of 
earnings. Moreover, it is apparent that firm-years in the interval to the right and left of 
                                                            
20 By deleting firm-years with negative Stockholder’s Equity we attempt to prevent any potential spurious 
effect arising from firms that might have particular incentives, if any, to undertake earnings management. 




zero have no significant difference in mean and median TAX and SPITEM,
21 and that the 
right interval has proportionally more BN firms that its counterpart on the left, consistent 




Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for DEBT, the change in total debt [￿(#6-#216)t / 
(#6-#216)t-1], by quadrants of market returns and prior period earnings (PRIOR), for both 
the left and right intervals. We take this variable as a proxy for firms’ needs of debt.
22 One 
can  see  that  the  changes  are  statistically  different  across  classes  of  PRIOR,  with  the 
exception of GN firms for the left interval, consistent with the intuition that firms with 
larger needs of debt tend to have a stronger incentive to report positive earnings. They are 
statistically independent of the sign of market returns, i.e. GN and BN firms have similar 





                                                            
21 The lack of statistical difference for variables TAX and SPITEM do not follow the evidence in Beaver et 
al.  (2003). Even  the difference  we  obtain  when  considering the  whole  earnings sample  rather  than  the 
observations around zero suggests that the impact of those variables may not be a driving force of the 
discontinuities in the earnings distribution.  
22 We take the change in debt instead of total debt as a proxy for firms’ needs of debt because the cost of 
debt is expected to be more related to the former than to the later.   
23 We also defined firms’ needs of debt as the change in long term debt (#9), the change in debt in current 
liabilities (#34) and the change in total debt defined as (#9+#34). The results are qualitatively similar to 




4.  Empirical results 
 
 
4.1.    Earnings management to avoid losses: graphical analysis 
4.1.1.  The discontinuities of the earnings distributions 
Exhibit 1, Fig. 1.1, reports the (truncated) distribution of deflated earnings levels.
24 It 
compares to Fig. 3 in BD (1997), and uses an interval width of 0.0025.
25 As expected, the 
frequency  discontinuities  at  zero  are  visible  and,  as  shown  in  Table  3,  have  highly 






Fig. 1.2 comparatively reports the (truncated) distributions of GN and BN firms. It can be 
seen that the distribution of GN firms (bars) is slightly skewed to the right, contrasting 
with  the  distribution  of  BN  firms  (solid  line).  This  is  consistent  with  the  descriptive 
statistics in Table 1, Panel B, showing that GN firms tend to have higher mean and median 
deflated  earnings.  The  discontinuities  at  zero  are  visible  in  both  distributions.  The 
standardized differences reported in Table 3 corroborate the visual assessment. For the 
interval to the left (right) of zero, they are 7.26 (-5.44) for GN and 12.44 (-7.25) for BN 
distributions. Moreover, the relative magnitude of these standardized differences together 
                                                            
24 Displaying truncated distributions, rather than complete ones, is intended to highlight the aim of the 
analysis, that is to say, the discontinuities around zero. 
25 The analysis was re-performed using an interval width of 0.005. The results are qualitatively similar. 
26 The standardized differences are higher than the maximum values tabulated in a standardized normal 
distribution  for  the  usual  level  of  confidence  (5%).  They  are  different  from  zero  at  less  than  0.0001. 
Throughout the paper the significance of these statistics is assessed against 1.96 (the 5% two-tail z-stat for a 




with  the  visual  graphical  evidence  suggest  that  the  discontinuities  around  zero  are  of 




Table 3 also reports the standardized differences for the discontinuities in the distributions 
of BN firms with prior period positive (BN_PRIOR_Pos) and negative (BN_PRIOR_Neg) 
earnings. For the interval to the left (right) of zero they are 11.29 (-7.18) for prior period 
positive earnings and 5.49 (-2.13) for negative earnings. For the sake of parsimony we do 
not display the graphs, but a visual assessment of the relative size of these differences 
suggests  that  the  discontinuities  are  higher  for  BN_PRIOR_Pos,  consistent  with  our 
second hypothesis. 
Finally,  this  Table  displays  the  standardized  differences  for  the  discontinuities  in  the 
distributions of BN firms with prior period positive earnings and high (BN_PP_DEBT_H) 
and low (BN_PP_DEBT_L) needs of debt.
27 The discontinuities are all significant. For the 
interval to the left (right) of zero they are 9.46 (-5.57) for high needs of debt and 5.96 (-
4.70) for low needs.
28 The relative size of the computed statistics is consistent with our 
third hypothesis, which states that BN firms with prior period positive earnings and high 
needs of debt undertake more earnings management than firms with low needs of debt.  
Thus, this graphical analysis seems to support all our hypotheses. However, as BD (1997) 
point out, the statistics we use do not allow precise inferences about relative differences in 
the discontinuities. Although their differences reflect the proportionate discontinuity, they 
                                                            
27 The 978 BN observations with missing DEBT have been deleted. This explains the difference, in Table 3, 
between  the  sum  of  BN_PP_DEBT_H  plus  BN_PP_DEBT_L  and  the  number  of  observations  in 
BN_PRIOR_Pos sub-sample. 




also depend on the number of observations, which varies across earnings intervals and 
distributions. Hence, those differences cannot be directly compared in order to assess the 
relative earnings management pervasiveness.  
Table  3  also  shows  an  estimate  of  the  number  of  firms  that  (supposedly)  managed 
earnings around zero. The expected number of observations minus the actual number of 
observations in the interval is labeled as “N. Observ.”, the former being defined as the 
average of the number of observations in the two adjacent intervals. Although the numbers 
seem  to  support  all  our  hypotheses,  the  same  constraint  of  the  different  number  of 
observations in each sub-sample prevents us from drawing a grounded conclusion. Our 




4.1.2.  Statistical difference in the degree of earnings management pervasiveness 
In sub-section 3.3) a) we defined the degree of earnings management pervasiveness (pp) 
as the proportion of the (predicted) number of firms in a given interval that undertakes 
earnings management over the expected number of firms in that interval. This definition 
has two advantages over the measurement discussed in the previous sub-section. Firstly, 
this new measurement takes into account the number of observations in each interval and 
thus enables direct comparisons to be made across earnings distributions and intervals. 




                                                            
29 These results are robust to different definitions of the variables, namely: i) definition of earnings (using 





Table 4, Panel A, reports estimates of the degree of pervasiveness to avoid losses for both 
intervals around zero, and for GN and BN firms. The latter have, for both intervals, a 
degree of pervasiveness slightly higher than 60 percent. That of GN firms is around 45 
percent. Thus, there is a difference in that degree of around 17 (13) percentage points to 
the left (right) interval. Using the statistical test for the difference between the proportions 
of  success in two  independent  samples  (Sandy,  1990) we find  that such an estimated 
difference is significant at less than 0.0001 in both intervals. Hence, BN firms show a 
higher  degree  of  pervasiveness  in  avoiding  earnings  losses,  consistent  with  the 
hypothesized incentive they face to manage earnings. This evidence is fully supportive of 
our first hypothesis and corroborates the conclusions of our previous visual assessment 
based on the empirical distributions. 
Table 4, Panel B, shows similar information for the sub-samples of BN firms with prior 
period  positive  (BN_PRIOR_Pos)  and  negative  (BN_PRIOR_Neg)  earnings.  The 
difference in pervasiveness is 11 percentage points to the left interval and 45 to the right, 
both of which are statistically significant. BN firms with prior period positive earnings, i.e. 
approaching the earnings target from above, are expected to face a higher incentive to 
manipulate earnings. A higher degree of pervasiveness suggests that such an incentive 
exists. This evidence adds to that discussed in the previous sub-section and is supportive 
of our second hypothesis.
30 
31  
                                                            
30 Untabulated results show that when we control for GN firms and prior period earnings sign there is no 
statistical difference in the degree of pervasiveness in the left interval, and this difference in the right interval 
is much smaller than that reported in Panel B and in favor of prior period negative earnings. Thus, the 
opposite we hypothesized for BN firms. 
31 We also tested for sub-samples of prior period positive and prior period negative earnings (untabulated 




Finally, Panel C displays information for the sub-samples of BN firms with prior period 
positive  earnings  and  low  (DEBT  Low)  and  high  (DEBT  High)  needs  of  debt.  The 
evidence is mixed. In the left interval the difference in pervasiveness is 12 percentage 
points and is statistically significant at the usual level of confidence. Firms with higher 
needs of debt seem to undertake more earnings manipulation, consistent with our third 
hypothesis. Conversely, and contrary to our expectations, in the right interval there is no 
significant difference in the degree of pervasiveness across distributions. However, given 
the  technical  characteristics  of  the  methodology  we  use,  the  smaller  number  of 
observations  in  each  sub-sample  might  affect  the  precision  of  the  assessment.  The 
statistics displayed in Table 2, on the number of observations, seem to give some support 
to this potential explanation for such an unexpected result. The proportion of firms with 
BN and prior period positive earnings is higher than that of GN firms in both intervals, 
and this proportion is higher in the right interval.  
In  sum,  the  empirical  evidence  collected  so  far  fully  supports  our  first  and  second 
hypotheses. It suggests that firms with BN in the current period and prior period positive 
earnings face a higher incentive to avoid losses, and do have a higher degree of earnings 
management pervasiveness. The occurrence of prior positive earnings does not by itself 
explain differences in this degree. Moreover, the empirical evidence partly supports our 
third hypothesis and the intuition that the needs of debt play a role in firms’ incentive to 
undertake earnings management.  
The importance of the overall evidence is threefold. Firstly, it adds to the literature that 
supports the discontinuities in the earnings distribution as being driven (at least partly) by 
earnings  management.  Secondly,  it  highlights  the  role  of  some  of  firms’  earnings 
                                                                                                                                                                                
The sign of prior earnings is a determinant of the incentive to undertake earnings management only when 




management incentives. The theory we test, and the results we obtain, contribute to a 
better understanding of these incentives and how they work. Thirdly, it challenges the 
implicit assumption in BD (1997) that the incentives to undertake earnings management 
are  similar  in all  firms.  Our  research  shows  that  the earnings  distribution  is  the joint 
impact  of  (at  least)  two  groups  of  firms  with  differentiated  incentives  to  manipulate 
earnings. 
Recent research (e.g. Dechow et al., 2003; Beaver et al., 2003; Durtschi and Easton, 2005) 
argues that the discontinuities in the earnings distributions may not be due to earnings 
management but to other reasons underlying those distributions. Despite the fact that the 
evidence in such research conflicts with the empirical results of other recent studies that 
support  the earnings  management explanation  (e.g. Beatty et al., 2002),  and with that 
presented so far in this paper, we perform a Probit analysis to test whether the underlying 
impact of market news on earnings, the way firms approach the zero earnings target and 
their needs of debt, are (in fact) driving forces of firms’ earnings management when other 
controls are in place. 
Below, we discuss the results of this analysis.   
  
4.2.  Probit analyses of differences in earnings management to avoid losses 
Table 5 displays the results of Probit analyses for the differential likelihood of reporting 
small profits versus small losses. As in the previous sub-section, we control for classes of 
GN and BN firms (D1), for classes of BN firms with prior period positive (negative) 
earnings (PRIOR) and, within those with prior positive earnings, for classes of high (low) 
needs of debt (DEBT).  
We perform six models with a similar structure. All of them control for some of the effects 




earnings distribution. These effects are size (SIZE), special items (SPITEM) and taxes 
(TAX).    The  analysis  includes  1,138  firm-year  observations  with  deflated  earnings 




Model 1 tests whether BN firms do undertake earnings management to avoid losses in a 
more pervasive way than GN firms. The coefficient on D1, the dummy variable reflecting 
the dichotomy GN vs. BN firms, is significantly positive, consistent with our expectation 
and the statistical evidence reported in Tables 3 and 4. This evidence supports our first 
testing hypothesis and suggests that BN firms are more pervasive in undertaking earnings 
management, reporting a significantly greater number of small profits and fewer small 
losses than GN firms do.
32  
We hypothesized that prior period earnings sign (PRIOR), i.e. the way firms approach the 
earnings target, is a determinant of the incentive to undertake manipulation. Models 2 and 
3  test  this  effect.  The  former  shows  that  the  coefficient  on  PRIOR  is  statistically 
insignificant, corroborating  our  previous  intuition  that  this  variable  is  not,  by  itself,  a 
driving  force  of  the  discontinuities  in  the  earnings  distributions.
33  Model  3  tests,  and 
supports,  the  intuition  underlying  our  second  hypothesis.  BN  firms  with  prior  period 
positive  earnings  (D1_PRIOR)  do  undertake  more  pervasive  earnings  management, 
                                                            
32 The proportion of BN firm-years in the first interval in the right hand side of the distribution is consistent 
with this result: approximately 57% against 46% in the first interval in the left and 47% for the whole 
distribution. 
33 Consistent with this outcome, graphical evidence not reproduced here shows that when we split the global 




consistent with the statistical evidence in Tables 3 and 4 (Panel B).
34 Thus, the way firms 
approach  the  earnings  target –  from above or from below  – is a determinant  of their 
incentive to manipulate earnings.  
Our third hypothesis proposes a likely reason why BN firms with prior period positive 
earnings  (PRIOR)  face  an  incentive  to  undertake  earnings  management:  to  avoid  an 
increase in their cost of debt. Thus, within this set of firms, those with larger needs of debt 
are expected to face a higher incentive to manipulate. Models 4 to 6 test this intuition 
using DEBT, a dummy variable that proxies for firms’ future needs of debt. Model 4 
shows that the coefficient on this variable is statistically insignificant, consistent with our 
intuition  that  firms’  needs  of  debt  are  not,  by  themselves,  a  driving  force  of  the 
discontinuities in the earnings distribution. However, testing for the interaction of this 
variable with PRIOR (Model 5), the coefficient is statistically significant, suggesting that 
firms approaching the earnings target from above (PRIOR) and with larger needs of debt 
(DEBT) do face a higher incentive to manipulate earnings. This is an unexpected result, 
and contradicts the expectation we formulated in sub-section 3.2. A potential reason for 
the significance of this coefficient is that the variable PRIOR_DEBT might be acting as a 
proxy for D1_PRIOR_DEBT. The fact that the coefficient on the latter (Model 6) and its 
level of significance are higher than those on PRIOR_DEBT seems to be supportive of 
this tentative explanation.
35 The evidence in Model 6 is consistent with the graphical and 
statistical  evidence  discussed  in  the  previous  sub-section,  showing  that  BN  firms 
approaching the earnings target from above and with larger needs of debt do report a 
significantly greater number of small profits and fewer small losses than other firms. This 
                                                            
34 If we test for BN firms with prior period negative earnings the coefficient is not significant. 
35 As we move from Model 1 to Model 6 the coefficient on the main variable is increasing, consistent with 




result  is  also  consistent  with  the  statistical  evidence  in  Table  3  and complements  the 
evidence in Table 4 (Panel C). Altogether, the empirical evidence in Models 4 to 6 fully 
support our third hypothesis.
36  
The coefficients on the control variables are systematically insignificant across models, 
consistent  with  untabulated  descriptive  statistics  discussed  in  sub-section  3.4.  This 
evidence suggests that firm size is  not a driving force of firms’  location  around zero 
earnings, and that the tax and special items effects discussed in Beaver et al. (2003) do not 
have, in the current study, a role in explaining the discontinuity at zero in the earnings 
distribution.  More  than  a  denial  of  previous  evidence  about  the  determinants  of  the 
discontinuities, our results suggest that at least a part of them is driven by discretionary 
actions undertaken by managers. 
In sum, the empirical evidence discussed in this sub-section highlights the importance of 
the sign of market returns (GN and BN) as a proxy for managers’ incentive to undertake 
earnings  management  to  avoid  losses,  and  the  roles  played  by  PRIOR  and  DEBT  in 
maximizing such an incentive. The results corroborate the empirical evidence collected 
from  the  graphical  and  statistical  analyses,  and  bring  to  light  a  new  and  intuitive 
explanation  for  the  discontinuities  around  zero  in  the  earnings  distribution.  They  are 




                                                            
36 The models in Table 5 are tested for the right interval at zero, i.e. for the likelihood of firms reporting a 
greater number of small profits. However, testing for the left interval (likelihood of reporting fewer small 
losses) does not qualitatively change the results. The same is true when we use other proxies for firms’ needs 
of debt [the sign of the change in long term debt (#9) and in total debt (#9+#34), and ranks of high/low long 




5.  Conclusion   
 
In this paper we analyze firms’ earnings management behavior to avoid losses conditional 
on the (asymmetric) incentive underlying market returns and prior period earnings signs. 
Our intuition is that firms with negative returns in the period face a higher incentive to 
undertake earnings management, and that their ultimate intention is to hide from credit 
markets a signal (loss) that could negatively affect their cost of debt.  
Our graphical and statistical empirical evidence supports this intuition. BN firms show 
higher earnings management pervasiveness than their counterparts with good news (GN), 
reporting  a  greater  number  of  small  profits  and  fewer  small  losses.  The  set  with 
simultaneously BN and prior period positive earnings (PRIOR) undertakes more pervasive 
earnings  manipulation  than  BN  firms  in  general.  However,  PRIOR  is  not  in  itself  a 
determinant of the location of firm-years around the zero earnings target.  
Within this restricted set of firms with BN and PRIOR, and consistent with a cost of debt 
explanation,  we  find  that  firms  with  larger  needs  of  debt  (DEBT)  show  higher 
pervasiveness in undertaking earnings management to avoid losses. As for PRIOR, we 
also tested for DEBT as the determinant of the discontinuity in the earnings distribution, 
but the variable was not significant. The results are robust to the use of graphical and 
statistical tests, including Probit models that control for some of the main variables that 
might affect the shape of the earnings distribution.   
This paper adds to a large and growing body of literature that discusses firms’ earnings 
management  behavior.  Recently  the  discussion  has  focused  on  whether  the  graphical 
evidence in BD (1997) is driven by firms’ intentional earnings manipulation or by a mere 
statistical effect related to an asymmetric impact of some earnings components, or even to 




Beatty et al., 2002 and Durtschi and Easton, 2005). The empirical evidence provided in 
these studies is mixed.  
The main contributions of our research to this literature are threefold.   Firstly, it extends 
the  methodology  introduced  in  BD  (1997)  and  uses  it  to  compare  the  earnings 
management  behavior  across  sets  of  firms  with  differentiated  characteristics  and/or 
incentives.  Secondly,  it  discusses  the  existence  of  asymmetric  earnings  management 
incentives and relates them to the discontinuities around the earnings zero target. Thus, it 
challenges the implicit assumption in the seminal paper of BD (1997) that this kind of 
incentive is homogeneous to all firms in the distribution. Our research shows that the 
earnings distribution is the joint impact of sets of firms with differentiated incentives to 
manipulate earnings. Finally, based on a well-grounded theory, it also contributes to a 
better understanding of the roles of earnings signals sent to credit markets and of firms’ 
debt  as  determinants  of  earnings  management.  At  a  time  when  firms’  earnings 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for deflated earnings. 
 
Panel A. Deflated earnings, by year. Period 1976/94. 
 
YEAR  NOBS  MEAN  STD  MEDIAN  %GN  %Pos 
1976  3254  0.066  0.069  0.065  0.74  0.89 
1977  3219  0.067  0.068  0.066  0.63  0.90 
1978  3136  0.076  0.068  0.073  0.66  0.92 
1979  3301  0.073  0.080  0.073  0.64  0.89 
1980  3575  0.058  0.097  0.063  0.69  0.85 
1981  3751  0.045  0.116  0.058  0.41  0.80 
1982  4271  0.010  0.141  0.038  0.56  0.70 
1983  4225  0.010  0.156  0.042  0.68  0.71 
1984  4409  0.003  0.168  0.045  0.35  0.70 
1985  4425  -0.017  0.180  0.034  0.57  0.64 
1986  4442  -0.027  0.195  0.027  0.49  0.62 
1987  4657  -0.023  0.200  0.030  0.38  0.63 
1988  4674  -0.019  0.197  0.032  0.53  0.64 
1989  4525  -0.022  0.198  0.027  0.51  0.62 
1990  4481  -0.033  0.204  0.021  0.30  0.61 
1991  4459  -0.033  0.198  0.016  0.63  0.60 
1992  4573  -0.029  0.206  0.022  0.53  0.62 
1993  4753  -0.025  0.211  0.029  0.59  0.64 
1994  5181  -0.024  0.226  0.039  0.42  0.68 







Panel B. Deflated earnings, by good (GN)/bad (BN) news. Period 1976/94. 
 
NEWS  NOBS  MEAN  STD  MEDIAN  %Pos 
GN  42296  0.038  0.145  0.058  0.76 
BN  37015  -0.038  0.197  0.017  0.58 
 
 
Panel C. Sample selection for the Probit analysis  of Table 5. Period 1976/94. 
 
Description  N. Observations 
Firm-years in the intervals immediately to the left and the right of zero  
(deflated earnings in the interval ] -0.0025; 0.0025 ]  ) 
1,153 
Firm-years with missing data or Stockholders’ Equity (#216) < 0  15 
Working sample  1,138 
Firm-years in the interval ] -0.0025; 0 ]  276 




a) Deflated earnings is Net Income (#172) deflated by prior period total assets (#6);  
b) GN is “good news” (RET³ 0), BN is “bad news” ” (RET< 0). RET is market return at the fiscal year end; 




Table 2. Change in total debt around the zero earnings target. 
 
    Prior Period Earnings (PRIOR)     
    Negative  Positive     
















0.815   







0.020   
1.98 
  Probability 
[GN=BN]  0.057  0.572 
   







0.003   







<0.001   
2.96 
  Probability 
[GN=BN]  0.300  0.929 
   
 
Notes: 
a) The values reported in the table are the medians of DEBT, the percentage change in total debt [￿(#6-
#216)t / (#6-#216)t-1]), that we take as a proxy for firms’ needs of debt. For example, firms with prior 
period  negative earnings and GN have DEBT  median equal to -0.017.  In  parenthesis we report the 
number of observations in each quadrant. Taking the same example, the number of observations is 63.  
b) The left interval is deflated net income ] -0.0025; 0 ] and the right interval is ] 0; 0.0025 ]; 
c)  “Probability” is the p-value of a Wilcoxon test for the equality of medians across classes; “%N.Obs.” is 




Table 3. Statistical significance of the discontinuities around zero earnings. 
 
  Discontinuity at the … 




“N. Observ.”  Z1 statist.  “N. Observ.”  Z1 statist. 
1.1  GLOBAL (79,311 obs.)  339  13.99  -305  -9.03 
1.2  GN (42,296 obs.)  122  7.26  -124  -5.44 
1.2  BN (37,015 obs.)  217  12.44  -181  -7.25 
  BN_PRIOR_Pos (25,032 obs.)  164  11.29  -154  -7.18 
  BN_PRIOR_Neg (11,983 obs.)  53  5.49  -27  -2.13 
  BN_PP_DEBT_H (15,791obs.)  103  9.46  -92  -5.57 




a)  As in BD (1997), the Z1 statistic tests the null hypothesis that the distribution of deflated earnings will be 
smooth. It is based on the difference between the actual number of observation in an interval and the 
expected number for that same interval, divided by the standard deviation of the difference. The latter is 
defined as follows: 




1 1 1 1 + - + - - - +
+ - =
i i i i
i i
p p p p N
p Np std ,  
  where N is the total number of observations in the sample and pi is the probability that an observation 
will  fall  into  interval  i.  Under  the  null  hypothesis  of  smoothness,  this  statistic  is  distributed 
approximately Normal with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The expected number of observations for a 
given interval is defined as the average of the number of observations in two adjacent intervals; 
b)  The assessment of the significance of these statistics is performed against 1.96. This number corresponds 




c)  “Global”  stands  for  the  whole  earnings  distribution;  GN    (BN)  for  good  (bad)  news  sub-sample; 
BN_PRIOR_Pos (BN_PRIOR_Neg) for sub-samples of BN firms with prior period positive (negative) 
earnings; BN_PP_DEBT_H (BN_PP_DEBT_L) for sub-samples of BN firms with prior period positive 
earnings and High (Low) needs of DEBT. DEBT is the percentage change in total debt [￿(#6-#216)t / 
(#6-#216)t-1]; 
d)  Earnings (#172) is deflated by total assets (#6) as of the end of the prior period;   
e)  “N. Observ.” equals the expected minus the actual number of observations in the interval. To the left of 




Table 4. Differences in the degree of pervasiveness to avoid losses. 
 
 
Discontinuity at the …   
Description  … left of zero  … right of zero 
Panel A: sub-samples of good and bad news firms 
  Good News  Bad News  Good News  Bad News 
1. Number of actual firms   149  133  390  481 
2. Number of expected firms  271  350  266  300 
3. Pervasiveness   ½(2-1)/2½  0.45  0.62  0.47  0.60 
4. Difference in pervasiveness  0.17  0.13 
5. Standard deviation  0.039  0.042 
6. Z2 Statistic [4/5]  4.26  3.29 
7. P-value  < 0.0001  < 0.0001 
Panel B: sub-samples of bad news firms with prior period positive / negative 
earnings 
  PRIOR Neg  PRIOR Pos  PRIOR Neg  PRIOR Pos 
    …     
4. Difference in pervasiveness  0.11  0.45 
5. Standard deviation  0.058  0.056 
6. Z2 Statistic [4/5]  1.87  8.01 





Panel C: sub-samples of bad news firms with prior period positive earnings 
and high/low needs of debt  
  DEBT Low  DEBT High  DEBT Low  DEBT High 
    …     
4. Difference in pervasiveness  0.12  -0.04 
5. Standard deviation  0.062  0.060 
6. Z2 Statistic [4/5]  1.94  -0.71 




a)  The Z2 statistic is the probability density function of the difference between the proportions of success in 
two independent samples (Sandy, 1990: chap. 10), and is distributed approximately Normal with mean 0 








= 2 , where the numerator is the difference between the proportions of “bad news” 
(b) and “good news” firms (g) undertaking earnings management.  











, where n is the number of expected 
“good news” (g) and “bad news” firms (b) in the interval.  p is the pooled proportion of both samples: 
       
b g
b b g g
n n







b)  The p-value underlying the critical value of the Z2 statistic are two-tailed; 
c)  The expected number of observations for a given interval is defined as the average of the number of 
observations in two adjacent intervals. To the left of zero the interval width is ]-0.0025; 0 ], to the right it 
is ] 0 ; 0.0025 ]. 
d)  PRIOR_Pos (PRIOR_Neg) are BN firms with prior period positive (negative) earnings; DEBT Low 






 Table 5. Probit analysis: determinants of earnings management to avoid losses.  
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a)  Intercept coefficients are untabulated, but they are all insignificant; year and industry intercept effects 




b)  Variable definitions: INTERV is a dummy variable that takes value one if net income is in the interval ] 
0; 0.0025 ], and value zero if the firm has deflated net income in the interval ] -0.0025; 0 ]; D1 is a 
dummy variable that takes value one if the firm has “bad news” in the year, zero otherwise; PRIOR is a 
dummy  variable  that  takes  value  one  if  prior  period  earnings  (#172)  is  positive,  zero  otherwise; 
D1_PRIOR is an interactive variable defined as D1*PRIOR; DEBT is a dummy variable that takes value 
one  if  the  change  in  total  debt  [￿(#6-#216)]  in  the  current  period  is  positive,  zero  otherwise; 
PRIOR_DEBT is an interactive variable defined as PRIOR*DEBT; D1_PRIOR_DEBT is an interactive 
variable defined as D1*PRIOR*DEBT; SIZE is a dummy variable that takes value one if firm market 
value (#199*#25) is in the upper third of the distribution, zero otherwise; SPITEM is Special Items (#17) 
and TAX is Income Taxes (#16), both deflated by prior period total assets (#6); SIND is a set of dummy 
variables, taking a value of one if the firm belongs to the industry, zero otherwise; SYEAR is a set of 
dummy variables, taking a value of one if the firm-year corresponds to the year, zero otherwise; i,t are 
firm and year (1976-1994) indexes, respectively. 
c)  The models have been regressed using 1,138 observations, and test for the likelihood of reporting a 
greater number of small profits (right interval). INTERV has 276 and 862 observations for classes 0 
(left)  and  1  (right),  respectively;  BN  firm-years  (D1=1)  are  54  percent  of  the  total  number  of 
observations, 78 percent of which are in class 1 (right); firm-years with positive change in total debt 
(DEBT=1) are 51 percent of the total number of observations, 53 percent of which are in class 1 (right); 
firm-years  with  prior  period  positive  earnings  (PRIOR=1)  are  65  percent  of  the  total  number  of 
observations, 66 percent of which are in class 1 (right). 




























Fig. 1.1.  Global distribution of net income (#172) deflated by total assets (#6) as of the beginning of the 
year ( 1 - t TA ). Interval width is 0.0025, and the first interval to the right of zero is ] 0 ; 0.0025 ]. 






























Fig. 1.2.  Comparative Good and Bad News distributions of net income (#172) deflated by total assets (#6) 
as of the beginning of the year ( 1 - t TA ). Interval width is 0.0025, and the first interval to the right 
of zero is ] 0 ; 0.0025]. The vertical axis represents the number of observations in each interval. 
 
  
 